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Do I contradict mysel?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(lam large, I contain multitudes) "
I. INTRODUCTION
I do not recall noticing the bronze letters, "Petigru College," on arriving at
the old law school building at the University of South Carolina for my
interview for a faculty position in February 1969. Nor did they impress me
until one day when, after teaching there several months, a student pointed them
out and told me about the man behind the name, James Louis Petigru. I was
delighted to learn that this conservative, southern law school was named after
a lawyer who had been a South Carolina abolitionist.
My initial delight however, was misplaced. At least one other legal
historian has shared my delusion. In 1988, Whitney North Seymour, Jr., a
highly regarded former United States Attorneyforthe Southern District ofNew
York, published an article which creates the misleading impression that Petigru
opposed slavery. Seymour's otherwise accurate account relates numerous
examples of the principled manner in which Petigru lived and practiced his
profession.2
* This essay is dedicated to the memory of Dr. George C. Rogers, Jr., 1918-1997, former
chairman of the Department of History of the University of South Carolina. George epitomized
the ideal scholar and gentleman.
** Solomon Blatt Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. Earlier versions of this
essay were presented to the Loblolly Society of Columbia, South Carolina, and at a faculty
colloquium at the School of Law of the University of South Carolina. The author is grateful for
helpful suggestions by both audiences, for research assistance by Michael Truesdale, and for
editorial suggestions by Terry Seligmann.
*** WALT WHITMAN, Song of Myself, in LEAvEs OF GRASS 22,72 (Bantam Books 1983)
(1892).
1. Whitney North Seymour, Jr., Heroes of the Bar: James Louis Petigru, Esquire, N.Y. ST.
B.J., Oct. 1988, at 48.
2. See id But see JAMES OSCARFARMER, JR., THE METAPHYSiCAL CONFEDERACY: JAMES
HENLEY THORMVELL AND THE SYNTHESIS OF SOUniERN VALUES 26 (1986) (calling Petigru
"admired eccentric" that "could be tolerated without fear."); Lacy Ford, James Louis Petigru:
The Last South Carolina Federalist, in INTELLECTrUAL LIFE IN ANTEBELLUM CHARLESTON 152,
1
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Seymour manipulates Petigru's life and legend to encourage today's
lawyers to practice their profession in a more principled fashion. This particular
encouragement bears constant repetition.3 Over the years Petigru's example
has beenusedto support numerous causes, some notnearly as worthy as others.
William and Jane Pease devote the first chapter of their recent, thorough
biography of Petigru to his legend and its use for various partisan purposes,
including the suppression of political dissent.4
Petigru's life is legendary. How could an out-spoken Unionist, an
implacable and articulate foe of the Negro Seaman's Act,' the South Carolina
Oath of Allegiance,6 the Confederate Sequestration Act,7 and secession in
general, be eulogized by confederate officers at a Charleston cemetery in 1863
with Union forces only twelve miles away?8 Furthermore, why would the New
York and Massachusetts Historical Societies devote special meetings to honor
his memory?9
This essay first sketches the facts of his life with some emphasis on
education, featuring Petigru as both student and teacher, and highlighting his
connections with the University of South Carolina. It then discusses Petigru's
political beliefs and political career, focusing on two contradictory themes: his
strong belief in the federal union as the best guarantor of individual liberties
through the rule of law, and his attitude toward slavery. Each theme reappears
in the section on his practice of law, which describes both his day-to-day
practice and some of his high-profile cases. The essay concludes by reflecting
on those bronze letters with which it began.
157-59 (Michael O'Brien & David Moltke-Hansen eds., 1986) (arguing that Petigru adopted
Federalist views partly to ingratiate himself with the Charleston aristocracy).
3. One almost hesitates to open the advance sheets for fear of reading about the discipline
of still more of our peers in the bar.
4. VILLIAMH. PEASE&JANEH.PEASE,JAMESLOUISPErIGRU: SOUTHERN CONSERVATIVE,
SOUTHERN DIssENTER 8 (1995). In 1919 during the Red Scare, John P. Thomas Jr., the then
president of the South Carolina Bar, praised Petigru's loyalty to the United States during the time
leading up to secession, and suggested that one with Petigru's loyalty to the federal government
would suppress the "fanatical minorities" who posed a threat to the American way of life. Id. at
8 (quoting John P. Thomas, Jr., James L. Petigru, Lawyer and Citizen, Address to the Joint
Session of Georgia and South Carolina Bar Associations (May 30, 1919), reprinted in 41
MERCERL. REV. 637, 650 (1990)).
5. Act of Dec. 19, 1835, 7 S.C. Stat. 470.
6. Act of Dec. 19, 1833, 8 S.C. Stat. 568.
7. Act of Aug. 30, 1861, ch. 61, Confederate States of America Stat. 201.
8. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 1.
9. John P. Thomas, Jr., James L. Petigru, Lawyer and Citizen, Address to the Joint Session
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II. HIS LIFE' °
He was bom James Louis Pettigrew near Abbeville, South Carolina, in
1789." His Scots-Irish, alcoholic father soon lost his own modest inheritance,
forcing the growing family to move in with the father's French Huguenot
brother-in-law at Badwell Farm, a moderately successful back-country concern
populated by, among others, several slaves. 2 Fortunately for Petigru, his
father's passions included books as well as liquor, and both mother and father
encouraged his intellectual pursuits. 3 Such direction was especially important
because rural, up-country South Carolina at the dawn of the nineteenth century
was culturally isolated with few educational opportunities. 4
Petigru enrolled at age fifteen in a nearby academy." Though housed in a
log cabin, the school had an excellent master, Moses Waddel, and a solid
reputation.'6 Petigru did so well in his two years there that Waddel asked him
to stay on as a teacher, but Petigru declined the offer. 7 With modest financial
support from his uncle and mother he enrolled in South Carolina College in
1806.18
Chartered in 1801, the college, which ultimately became the University of
South Carolina, did not begin operations until 1805.1' Exempted from
requirements in Greek, Latin, and other subjects because of his education with
Waddel, Petigru enrolled as a sophomore20 and graduated at the top of his
class2' despite his having to work part-time and live off campus.' Such
deprivations may have been advantages in disguise, insulating him to some
extent from the drunken revelry for which the college became known, then,'s
as well as now. His insulation was far from complete, however, as Petigru
drank to excess on occasion.2
10. This section provides no more than a sketch of Petigru's life. It omits most aspects of his
personal life, including his admirable lifelong devotion to and support of his immediate and
extended families in spite of financial hardships and other disappointments, such as his wife's
drug addiction. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 70.
11. Id., at 12. Petigru changed the Scots-Irish spelling of his name (Pettigrew) to the French
Huguenot version when he moved to Charleston. Id. at 17-18.
12. Id. at 14.
13. Id. at 15.
14. 1 DANIEL WALKER HOLLIS, SOUTH CAROLINA COLLEGE 6 (1951).




19. 1 HOLLIS, supra note 14, at 3.
20. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 16.
21. WILLIAM J. GRAYSON, JAMSs LOuiS PETIGRU 46 (1866).
22. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 16. The non-affluent Petigru was in a distinct minority
at what was known as a rich man's institution. 1 HOLLIS, supra note 14, at 5-6, 130-3 1.
23. 1 HOLLIS, supra note 14, at 53-55.
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Two aspects of his time in college merit special mention. One was his
close friendship with William Grayson, the son of a wealthy Beaufort family.'
Though differing substantially on subsequent political developments, they
remained close friends for life, and Grayson wrote Petigru's first biography.26
The other was his participation in the Clariosophic Society, a debating
organization." Founded the year Petigru entered the college, the Clariosophic
Society still has a handsome meeting room on the top floor of Legare College
on a portion of the University campus known as the "Horseshoe."28 Here he
developed not only the lawyer's skills of thinking on his feet and making
persuasive arguments, but also a keen interest in politics and political theory.29
The master of his secondary school was not the only one to recognize
Petigru's potential as ateacher. While at South Carolina College, Petigru taught
part-time at the Columbia Academy," and after graduating became the master
of a school in the small village of Eutaw, where he became friends with Daniel
Elliot Huger, a prominent local planter.3 Shortly thereafter, Huger helped
Petigru secure a position at the more prestigious Beaufort College where he
served for a brief time as acting president.32 Years later Petigru stated that had
he been appointed president of the school, a position he had wanted, he
probably would have remained in academia.33 This remark prompted Grayson
to speculate that had Petigru remained in teaching, no doubt he ultimately
would have ascended to the presidency of South Carolina College. 4 As
Grayson observed, "[a]ny body can make a lawyer or politician, but where
could such a college president be found within the limits of the country?"35
Given Petigru's accomplishments within his chosen profession, Grayson's
speculation may not have been far off the mark.
critics thought, often drank beyond moderation.").
25. GRAYSON, supra note 21, at 42; PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 17.
26. GRAYSON, supra note 21. Petigru's lifelong friendship with Grayson is an example of
the "old boy network" from which early graduates of the college often benefited. 1 HOLLIS, supra
note 14, at 259-60.
27. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 16.
28. In Petigru's time, both the Clariosophic Society and its competitor, the Euphradian
Society, which today has a meeting room in Harper College on the horseshoe, shared meeting
space in the chapel in Rutledge College, the first building of South Carolina College. 1 HOLLIS,
supra note 14, at 232 (calling the building that housed the chapel the "Old South Building").
Petigru served as president of the Clariosophic Society at South Carolina College. Clariosophic
Society 1806-1892, (Feb. 25, 1809) (unpublished notebook, located in University of South
Carolina Archives Warehouse, Columbia, South Carolina), and once moderated an interesting
debate on slavery. See infra note 94.
29. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 17.
30.Id. at 18.
31. Id. at 18-19.
32. Id. at 19.
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South Carolina College selected Petigru to give the keynote address at the
college's fiftieth anniversary.36 The address has been described "as one of the
most important documents in the history of the institution" because of its
discussion of the college's origins.37 Though Petigru left Carolina College to
practice law, he took an active interest in the college and tried, on two
occasions, to influence important personnel decisions, apparently for political
reasons.
38
While teaching in Beaufort, Petigru read law with a local attorney and was
admitted to the bar in 1812. 3' This was an unfortunate time to start a law
practice. The War of 1812 greatly hindered the local economy, which depended
on exporting agricultural products to England.' With little money in
circulation, attorneys' fees were not a top priority.4' During his first several
years as an attorney Petigru made more money from teaching law to apprentices
than from its actual practice.42 This practice perhaps was sometimes primarily
a function of his love for teaching, at other times of his need for money.43
Clients eventually began to seek his services. His developing reputation
and the efforts of his mentor, Daniel Huger, resulted in his election by the
legislature as solicitor for the Beaufort District in 1816.' That same year he
married Jane Amelia Postell, the daughter of a prosperous local planter.45 Three
years later, again in large part due to Huger's influence, Petigru moved to
Charleston to become ajunior partner of the politically well-connected James
Hamilton. In 1822, Petigru took over his thriving practice after Hamilton's
election to Congress.' By this time Petigru had become such a well-respected
player in the South Carolina legal community that he was selected by the
36. 1 HOLLIS, supra note 14, at 4-5.
37. Id. at5.
38. See id. at 110 (describing Petigru's 1831 effort to oust Thomas Cooper, an outspoken
Nullifier, from the presidency of the college); see also 1 HOLLIs, supra note 14, at 190-91
(relating Petigru's support of the unsuccessful efforts of Professor Francis Lieber, a strong
nationalist, to become president of the college in 1855).
39. PEASE & PEE, supra note 4, at 19.
40. See GRAYSON, supra note 21, at 72.
41. Id. at 72-73.
42. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 20.
43. In the past, apprenticeship was the standard method of entering the professions, and it
was not until 1958 that applicants for the bar in South Carolina were required to be law school
graduates. Rules for the Examination and Admission of Persons to Practice Law in South
Carolina, Rule 5 (Michie 1962) (establishing for the first time a requirement for law school
graduation).
44. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 20-21.
45. Id. at 22.
46. Id at 21, 24-25. Hamilton subsequently became governor and was a strong Nullifier. lI
at 37. Nonetheless, he and Petigru remained friends for life. See id. at 117. This relationship was
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legislature as state attorney general.47
In spite of his comparatively rough, back-country origins, Petigru fit in
easily with the rich and powerful. Indeed, thanks to his combination of intellect,
learning, and social skills, he soon became an integral part of Charleston
society's upper echelons, as evidenced by his election to the vestry of Saint
Michael's Episcopal Church." Petigru's flourishing law practice afforded him
a fairly lavish lifestyle, which included a great deal of entertaining.49 However,
unlike his elite contemporaries, Petigru lacked inherited or otherwise
accumulated wealth to fall back on in hard times. His lack of financial acumen,
his generosity (especially his readiness to co-sign loans for his friends and firm
commitment to full payment when his friends defaulted), and his wife's
extravagances nearly bankrupted him on several occasions." At the time of his
death at age seventy-three, he was still working hard to make a living in spite
of poor health."
III. POLITICAL BELIEFS AND POLITICAL CAREER
Petigru was first and foremost a political conservative whose strong belief
in the rule of law led him to be an ardent Unionist. He was fond of saying, "I
came in with the Constitution," referring as much to his political posture as to
his date of birth.52 He displayed an apprehension of rule by majority vote if not
subjectto constitutional constraints to protect minority interests." Intellectually
a Unionist and emotionally a Southerner," he was a complex man who lived
in complex times.
In the 1830s, the political issue in South Carolina was nullification.55 The
conflicts swirling around the issue provided the stage on which Petigru played
out his political career. Congress provided the catalyst for nullification by
enacting a tariff on imported textiles in 1828.56 Many Southerners perceived the
tariff to be a defacto tax on their cotton exports for the benefit of Northern
textile mills. 7 The Nullifiers, also known as states' righters, claimed the state
47. Id. at 26.
48. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 36.
49. Id. (noting Petigru's "Sunday afternoon feasts").
50. See id. at 92-94.
51. GRAYSON, supra note 21, at 168.
52. Seymour, supra note 1, at 48.
53. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 61-62.
54. Id. at 172.
55. See, e.g., GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: ANARRATIVE HSTORY 415-23 (2d ed.
1988).
56. Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 270; see IRVINGH. BARmLr, JOHN C. CALHOuN,
145-52 (1993).
57. See BARTLr, supra note 56, at 139, 142; PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 37.
[Vol. 49:531
6
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had the power to reject a law enacted by Congress." To Petigru, such a
proposition posed a revolutionary threat to the country.59 Should the
nullification doctrine be recognized by realpolitik or otherwise, the
constitutional union would be broken. Petigru believed that the best way to
avoid that catastrophe would be to derail any effort at a formal declaration of
nullification.'
In order to help persuade the legislature not to call a nullification
convention, Petigru resigned his position as attorney general in 1831 to run for
the state senate.6 He narrowly lost, but later that year he was elected to a
vacant seat in the state house of representatives,62 a position he lost the next
year in the Nullifiers' landslide of 1832.63 After the election, a special
convention was called that promptly adopted an ordinance nullifying the tariff,
precluded its collection, and imposed a mandatory oath of allegiance to South
Carolina upon all state officials.'
These were tense times in South Carolina.6" Although the Nullifiers
constituted a substantial majority throughout the state, the Unionists had their
own dedicated adherents." Physical fights during the 1832 election
foreshadowed greater violence during the election of 1834.67 Andrew Jackson's
threat of military action,6" and Congress enacting a compromise tariff in 183369
prompted the Nullifiers to rescind the bulk of the Nullification Ordinance, °
although they retained the requirement of the oath of allegiance to the state.7
The Unionists, correctly perceiving that the scope of the oath could be
expanded and used to preclude them from state office, promptly filed suit. They
sought to invalidate the oath, but lost at the trial court level before a Nullifier
judge.72 Petigru and Thomas S. Grimkd argued for the Unionists before the
58. See BARTLETT, supra note 56, at 149-52.




63. Id. at 51-52.
64. Ordinance of November 24, 1832, 1 S.C. Stat. 329; see PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4,
at 52. The ordinance forbade appeals to the United States Supreme Court from state court
judgments validating the nullification ordinance, and further threatened with contempt of court
any persons attempting such an appeal. I S.C. Stat. at 330.
65. See, e.g., PEAsE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 51-52 (describing mob violence between
Unionists and Nullifers).
66. See id. at 52-54.
67. See id. at 51-52, 54, 63.
68. See id. at 54.
69. Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 227, 4 Stat. 583 (repealing parts of the Act of May 19, 1828,
ch. 55, 4 Stat. 270).
70. Ordinance of March 15, 1833, 1 S.C. Stat. 390.
71. See PEASE&PEASE, supra note 4, at 58.
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three-judge court of appeals.73
The oath was fairly innocuous on its face: "I... do solemnly swear, (or
affirm, as the case may be,) that I will be faithful, and true allegiance bear to the
State of South Carolina."74 Petigru argued that "the authors of this measure
have set a definition [of] 'allegiance,' which makes it... a term of art, to
express certain controverted opinions concerning the nature of the Constitution
of the United States, and renders the oath.., a complete criterion of party-in
one word, a test oath."' The source of the oath, the Ordinance of 1833, forbade
allegiance to any other government.76 It authorized the General Assembly to
require the oath of citizens and office holders, to prohibit all other allegiances,
to define violations of the oath, and prescribe penalties for violations.77
Petigru's main arguments against the oath included a natural law appeal for
recognition of the inherent liberty of the individual78 and a claim that the oath
necessarily violated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.79
Petigru and the Unionists won the case, but on the narrow ground that the
convention called to rescind the nullification of the tariff lacked the authority
under the South Carolina Constitution to enact the oath requirement."
It was a temporary victory. With a larger majority in the 1834 legislature,
the Nullifiers were poised to enshrine the oath in the state constitution, a move
likely to exacerbate an already volatile situation.8 The Legislature invited
Petigru to address ajoint session of that body to help defuse the issue through
compromise.82 Petigru was instrumental in crafting a compromise that included
a watered-down version of the oath.83 However, the Nullifiers in the legislature
73. State ex reL M'Cready v. Hunt, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 1 (1834) (Arguments of counsel run
for more than two hundred pages, with Grimk6s's argument beginning on page 14 and Petigru's
on page 113. The opinion of the court begins on page 209.)
74. Act of Dec. 19, 1833, 8 S.C. Stat. 568, 570.
75. M'Cready, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) at 116.
76. See Ordinance of March 18, 1833, 1 S.C. Stat. 400 (mandating that "allegiance of the
citizens of this State... is due to the said State; and that obedience only, and not allegiance, is
due by them to any other power... ).
77. Ordinance of March 18, 1833, 1 S.C. Stat. 400, 401.
78. M'Cready, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) at 120.
79. Id. at 121-22. After outlining this last argument, Petigru, apparently worn out, stated:
"I have no inclination, nor strength, to pursue the argument."Id at 122. Petigru could have argued
that the understanding of the oath of allegiance to include a rejection of allegiance to any other
government directly contradicts the requirement of an oath of allegiance by state officials to the
federal constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
80. M'Cready, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) at 223 ("[Tihey rescinded the ordinance of nullification;
but again nullified another act ofCongress ... commonly called the 'Force Bill.' Here ended their
powers.").
81. PEAsE&PEASE, supra note 4, at 62.
82. Id. at 64.
83. "I do solemnly swear, (or affirm,) that I will be faithful, and true allegiance bear, to the
State of South Carolina... and preserve, protect and defend, the constitution of this State and of
the United States." Act of Dec. 17, 1834, 8 S.C. Stat. 578, 578.
[Vol. 49:531
8
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were hardly through. The following year they abolished the court of appeals. 4
This may have vexed Petigru not only because it was the court of appeals that
had invalidated the earlier oath, but also because it was the venue in which he
had successfully argued numerous appeals in his regular law practice.85
Although he later served another two-year term in the House of
Representatives, by the middle of the 1830s Peigru's political career was over
as a practical matter.86 His vocal insistence on the necessity of the protections
of the United States Constitution against the tyranny of the majority in South
Carolina doomed any prospects of him garnering widespread political support
during the prelude to secession.8
On the national scene President Jackson and President Lincoln considered
Petigru for appointment to the United States Supreme Court8 However,
political machinations frustrated both appointments as well as a possible
appointment as United States Attorney.General by President Fillmore in 1850.89
At Fillmore's personal urging, however, Petigru agreed to serve as United
States Attorney for South Carolina. Petigru initially rejected this appointment,
but when he could not persuade any other prominent South Carolinian to accept
the office, he relented."
Politically and philosophically out of tune with his time and place, Petigru
was aware that his voice of dissent and calls for moderation were largely
ignored, regardless of how well respected he may have been. His frustration is
evidenced by his often quoted but apocryphal statement: "South Carolina-too
small for a republic, too large for an asylum."'"
Even a cursory review of Petigru's political beliefs must touch on his
attitudes toward race and slavery. He was never an abolitionist in either word
or deed, although in his student days at South Carolina College he moderated
a debate in the Clariosophic Society when that body concluded that "justice
84. Act of Dec. 18, 1835, 7 S.C. Stat. 334.
85. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 66.
86. Id. at 66-67.
87. See id. at 67.
88. Id. at 69-70, 161.
89. Id. at 153.
90. JAMES PEITGRU CARSON, LiF, LEYERS AND SPEECHES OFJAMES LOUIS PETIGRU 280-83
(1920).
91. PEASE & PEAsE, supra note 4, at 156. This author could find no direct verification that
Petigru made this statement. The Peases' source for this statement is a life-and-letters biography
by James Blyth Allston which was published serially in the Charleston Sunday News from 1899
to 1900 and later compiled in a scrapbook entitled Life and Times ofJames L. Petigru, now in the
Charleston Library Society. Letter from William H. Pease to William S. McAninch (Dec. 17,
1996) (on file with author); PEASE &PEASE, supra note 4, at 225. In the letter, Dr. WilliamPease
noted that Allston, a nephew by marriage of Petigru, probably had the quotation as apart of direct
family lore rather than as a second-hand story picked up on the street. During a presentation by
the author of this essay to the Loblolly Society of Columbia, South Carolina, one of the members
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require[s] the manumi[s]sion of slaves in the [s]outhern [s]tates."' While he
considered the institution of slavery a wrong against humanity and opposed its
expansion into newly admitted states, Petigru accepted its existence in the
South and never called for its abolition. 3
Petigru owned slaves from the time of his marriage in 1816 throughout his
life.94 In times of prosperity he had as many as twenty-two slaves in Charleston
to tend to his house and office.9' He prided himself on being a "good master"'
and noted with particular satisfaction his improvement of the standard of living
of the slaves on a plantation he purchased on the Savannah River.' There is no
readily accessible record, however, of any efforts by Petigru on behalf of the
slaves on an Alabama cotton plantation he invested in which proved to be a
financial disaster.98
While he emancipated only one of his own slaves in forty-seven years of
slave ownership," Petigru did help his clients work their way around South
Carolina's statutory ban on private emancipation."r° For example, he worked
for years to secure the freedom of slaves one of his clients had attempted to free
in his will."°' Petigru not only won the case but also got a special bill of
emancipation passed through the legislature, helped secure money to purchase
two family members who had been wrongfully sold, and sent the entire family
to Liberia." z During his second term in the legislature, Petigru assisted
disenfranchised freed blacks by introducing special legislation for the
emancipation of family members. 3 Also to Petigru's credit is the legislative
rejection of his efforts to codify state law' perceived as too lenient towards
slaves and freed blacks." 5 On the other hand, during his practice of law,
92. Minutes of meeting of the Clariosophic Society for Feb. 25, 1809, CLARIOSOHIC
SociErYMNmUs 1806-1811 (located in University of South Carolina Archives, Columbia, South
Carolina).
93. See CARSON, supra note 90, at 347-48.
94. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 134, 166.
95. Id. at 134.
96.Id.
97.Id. at 86.
98. Id. at 92 (describing the financial disaster with no mention of the slaves).
99. Id. at 134.
100. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 137.
101. Id. at 137-38.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 82.
104. Id. at 145.
105. Id at 167-69. Ultimately, Petigru's proposed code was relied upon extensively by D.T.
Corbin, one of the three reconstruction commissioners, when he drafted the code enacted in 1869.
See Act of Mar. 9, 1869, 14 S.C. Stat. 207 (1869); William Lewis Burke, Jr., A History of the
Opening Statement from Barristers to Corporate Lawyers: A Case Study ofSouth Carolina, 37
AM. J. LEGAL HST. 25, 44 n.150 (1993) (noting that the inside cover of a copy of Petigru's code
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Petigru never challenged the validity of the onerous criminal justice system
applicable to these groups."° Moreover, there is no record of his comment, let
alone condemnation, of the closed court trials in Charleston that sentenced to
death thirty-five slaves allegedly involved in the aborted Denmark Vesey slave
uprising.10
7
In general Petigru's attitudes towards slaves and blacks were quite
progressive for his time. For example, Petigru played a key role in preventing
the destruction of a newly erected church for slaves when irate citizens wanted
to destroy it following some local black-against-white violence.!0 8 In an 1841
commencement address at Oglethorpe University, Petigru noted the inferiority
of the "savage" to the "civilized" race; but then remarkably, in the context of
antebellum South Carolina, observed that the problem with the former was
primarily their lack of knowledge-a problem which could be solved through
education.' 9
IV. THE PRACTICE OF LAW
For fifty years Petigru worked as a successful and highly respected
attorney. His clients ranged from banks, railroads, and wealthy planters to poor
widows and more than his fair share of pro bono cases. Although his practice
started slowly in 1812 in rural Beaufort County, his reputation grew rapidly,
especially after his move to Charleston."' His broad general practice
emphasized trust and probate, debt settlement, commercial law, corporate law,
and real estate."' During the 1840s, he appeared in one quarter of all the cases
in the Charleston County Court of Equity, and, it is speculated, in a similar
percentage of cases in the Court of Common Pleas." 2 Between 1819 and 1860,
he appeared in 355 appellate cases in South Carolina, winning fifty-eight
106. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 134-35.
107. Id. at 30-31.
108. Id. at 136-37. In his remarkable book about slavery on the rice plantations to the north
of Charleston, Charles Joyner makes the following interesting observation about planters' mixed
motivations for promoting Christianity among the slaves:
The rice planters supported such attempts at religious instruction of the
slaves in part out of genuine concern for the slaves' spiritual welfare. The
religion they taught to the slaves, however, was a highly selective form of
Christianity, which stressed obedience in the here and now as much as
salvation in the hereafter.
CHARLES JOYNER, DOWN BY THE RivERSIDE: A SOUTH CAROLINA SLAVE COMMUNITY 156
(1984).
109. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 135.
110. See id. at 24-25.
111. See id. app. C, at 178.
112. Id. at 98. Appendices A, B, and C of the Peases' monograph provide detailed statistical
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percent of them.
11 3
While Petigru is remembered more for his politically significant cases than
for his day-to-day practice, it is the latter that developed his enviable reputation
as an attorney. Even discounting the glowing rhetoric expected in a memorial,
it is hard not to be impressed with the following description of Petigru:
He never was a mere lawyer to his clients. He was a friend, and a
sincere friend; and, when called on for his counsel, he never stopped
at expounding the law, but placed before his clients the duties their
positions required. With him, honor was worth more than property;
and he frankly and freely counseled the course that high morals
required his clients to pursue, irrespective of law. 4
However, Petigru the lawyer was, after all, human and not without his
shortcomings. After imprudently telling one of his first clients that he would
surely win, Petigru lost at trial, lost on appeal, and ended up paying the
judgment out of his own pocket rather than admit the loss to his client."' He
blamed the loss of an important case in the Florida Supreme Court on the
"ignorance of Judges,""16 and toward the end of his career he lost a case
because of his acknowledged failure to read South Carolina appellate
opinions."'
Petigru's willingness to speak eloquently and effectively for unpopular
clients and causes is exemplified by his pro bono representation of Reuben
Smalle."8 Smalle moved from Massachusetts to the rural South Carolina
Lowcountry to work as a woodcutter." 9 A sharp trader with an apparently
obnoxious personality, Smalle quickly alienated the whites in the rural area and
compounded that problem by associating with slaves. 2 Rumored to be an
abolitionist bent on undermining local ways,' prominent local planters
accused him ofa minor crime, and subsequently convicted and whipped him."
Petigru's Beaufort friend and biographer, William Grayson, suggests that the
113. See id. app. A, at 177. (table detailing Petigru's appellate court cases by decade).
114. Hon. R. Bamwell Rhett, Statement at the Proceedings of the Bar of Charleston, S.C.,
Mar. 25, 1863, reprinted in MEMORIAL OF THE LATE JAmEs L. PETIGRU 26-27 (Charleston, S.C.,
Walker, Evans & Cogswell, Printers 1880).
115. Seymour, supra note 1, at 50.
116. PEASE& PEASE, supra note 4, at 121.
117. Id. at 116-17.
118. See GRAYsoN, supra note 21, at 155-56; PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 142-45;
Seymour, supra note 1, at 49-50.
119. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 142.
120. Id. at 143.
121. GRAYsoN, supra note 21, at 155.
122. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 143.
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only law involved up to this point was administered by "Judge Lynch."'"
Petigru represented Smalle in an action against the planters in federal
district court in Columbia. 4 The planters' attorney tried to appeal to the jury's
prejudice against the Yankee abolitionist (and to tar Petigru with the same
brush), and actually praised his clients' resort to lynching." Petigru's argument
stressed the crucial civil liberties issue underlying the case-everyone is
threatened when taking an unpopular position becomes a punishable offense.'26
The jury returned an astonishing $2500 verdict in Smalle's favor. 27
In addition to his challenge to the oath of allegiance requirement, Petigru
openly challenged the constitutionality of two other notorious provisions of that
era-the South Carolina Negro Seaman's Act'28 and the Confederate
Sequestration Act. 29 The South Carolina Negro Seaman's Act provided:
[I]n case any vessel shall arrive in any port or harbour of this State,
from any other State or foreign port, having on board any free negro
or person of color, employed on board such vessel, as a cook, steward
or mariner, or in any other employment, it shall be the duty of the
sheriff of the district in which such port or harbour is situated,
immediately on the arrival of such vessel, to apprehend such free
negro or person of color.., and to confine him or her closely in jail,
until such vessel shall be hauled off from the wharf, and ready to
proceed to sea. 3 '
The statute further mandated that the captain of the vessel pay for the seamen's
incarceration.'
The British were able to negotiate changes to similar statutes in other
southern states, but the apparently caustic personality of the British consul
precluded such relief in South Carolina.132 The British consul retained Petigru
to challenge the statute. 3 Petigru argued that South Carolina's statute was
invalid because it was contrary to a treaty between Britain and the United States
providing for the liberty of their citizens when accompanying commercial ships
123. GRAYSON, supra note 21, at 155.
124. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 143. Presumably, jurisdiction in the federal court was
based upon diversity of citizenship with Smalle claiming to be a Massachusetts citizen. All
official records of the case were destroyed by fire.
125. Id at 143-44.
126. See id. at 144.
127. Id.
128. Act of Dec. 19, 1835, 7 S.C. Stat. 470.
129. Act of Aug. 30, 1861, ch. 61, Confederate States of America Stat. 201.
130. Act of Dec. 19, 1835, 7 S.C. Stat. 470, 471.
131. Id. at 470-72.
132. PEAsE&PEAsE, supra note 4, at 139.
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into each other's ports.' In addition, Petigru argued that local or state law
unconstitutionally impairs contracts when it modifies treaties with another
country without that country's consent.'35
Selecting an appropriate court was Petigru's first problem. Federal courts
had a jurisdictional minimum of $500 in actions for damages,'36 a sum
substantially in excess of the charges for boarding the seamen in jail.'37 While
a state court would likely be hostile to any challenge to the statute, Petigru
reasoned such challenge would be the quickest route to the United States
Supreme Court. 3 ' He further realized, though, that victory in the Supreme
Court might prove hollow should South Carolina ignore the Court's
pronouncements and continue to enforce the statute.'39 Petigru's strategy
quickly was undermined by the doctrine ofmootness. His appeal from the state
trial court's denial of habeas corpus on behalf of a detained seaman was
dismissed because the seaman already had been released from jail when his
ship left port.'"
Avoiding both the jurisdictional and mootness problems, Petigru brought
an assault and battery and false imprisonment action for substantial damages
in federal court against the sheriff on behalf of a Negro seaman who had been
detained for eight days while his ship was in port.141 The sheriff pleaded the
Negro Seaman's Act as justification. 42 The trial judge rejected Petigru's
challenges to the statute, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant
sheriff.43 The British ultimately dropped the planned appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, and a new, more diplomatic consul negotiated an
amendment to the act which allowed Negro seamen to remain on board ship
while in port rather than injail.1" An interesting aspect of his representation of
the British consul in this litigation is that Petigru was, at the same time, the
United States District Attorney for South Carolina."'
The Confederate Sequestration Statutes, attempting to confiscate the
property and wealth owned by and owed to people inthe Union states, provided
134. Id. at 139.
135. Id. Petigru cited an opinion of John C. Calhoun, while Secretary of State, for the
proposition concerning the inability to modify treaties by local action. Id.
136. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
137. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 139-40.
138. Id. at 140.
139. Id.
140. Exparte Pereira, 40 S.C.L. (6 Rich.) 59, 60 (1853).
141. Roberts v. Yates, 20 F. Cas. 937, 937 (C.C.D.S.C. 1853).
142. Id. at 938.
143. Id.
144. ActofDec. 20,1856, § 3,12 S.C. Stat. 491,492; PEASE&PEASE, supra note 4, at 141-
42.
145. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 141-42. This fact prompted the Peases to speculate
that "if there was not active collaboration with Washington, there was at least knowledgeable
assent ...... Id. at 142.
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Petigru with another opportunity to champion individual rights. These statutes
initially required that all debts owed to residents of the United States be paid
instead to the treasury of the Confederate States. 46 Shortly thereafter, in
response to a United States general sequestration statute, the Confederate
Congress required the sequestration of all property of every description owned
by "any alien enemy."' 4 Under penalty of criminal sanction, other provisions
required that attorneys, agents, and trustees speedily provide information
regarding all property subject to confiscation. 4
The provision of the act requiring an attorney to reveal his clients'
properties that were subject to sequestration affected Petigru personally. Courts
issued writs of garnishment against Petigru and other attorneys requiring them
to appear in court to answer questions designed to provide the information
required by the statute.'49 Former United States Circuit Court Judge Andrew
Magrath, one of Petigru's former pupils, heard the consolidated cases in
Confederate District Court in Charleston. 5 '
Petigru began his argument by explicitly refusing to answer questions
concerning his clients' properties, grounding his position in natural law: "[A]s
St. Paul says, I was born free and will not forfeit that freedom which I inherit
from my free mother. I will not Submit to be commanded where there is no right
to command."'' Petigru's argument based on natural law and states' rights was
ironic coming from a slave-owning Federalist. Petigru argued that the
Confederate Congress lacked the authority to enact the sequestration statute
and, in doing so, infringed upon the inherent sovereignty of the state. 2 Petigru
noted that many had perceived the primary problem with the United States
Constitution was that it did not sufficiently cabin the powers of the federal
government, resulting in an unwarranted diminution of the sovereignty of the
states. 3 Though patterned closely on the U.S. Constitution, the Confederate
Constitution attempted to more narrowly circumscribe the specific powers
granted to its central government.'54 Since the Confederate Constitution
146. Act of May 21, 1861, ch. 53, Confederate States of America Stat. 151. Such
confiscation statutes were hardly novel. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304 (1816) (addressing the propriety of a Virginia confiscation statute enacted during the
Revolutionary War).
147. Act of Aug. 30, 1861, ch. 61, Confederate States of America Stat. 201, 201; PEASE &
PEASE, supra note 4, at 162-63.
148. Act of Aug. 30, 1861, ch. 61, §§ 2, 3, Confederate States of America Stat. 201, 201.
149. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 4, at 163-64.
150. Id. at 163.
151. THE SEQUESTRATION CASES 22 (1861). This book can be found in the South Carolina
Legal History Room at the Coleman Karesh Law Library, University of South Carolina School
of Law.
152. Id. ("[T]he Constitution of the Confederate States ... positively, plainly and without
equivocation excludes any encroachment on the full and entire sovereignty ofthe several States.").
153. Id. ("Under the United States Sovereignty was the root of bitterness.").
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contained no provision authorizing writs of garnishment to compel attorneys
and other citizens to divulge private information, Petigru argued that those
sections of the sequestration statute were invalid."'5 He analogized the writs of
garnishment to general warrants, which presumably the Confederate Congress
lacked the authority to enact." 6
Petigru was not the only lawyer in this case whose argument was ironic.
Representing the Confederate States, acting District Attorney C.R. Mills argued
that the Confederate Congress enacted the sequestration statutes pursuant to a
necessary, incidental power which existed in relation to the war power." 7
Naturally, Mills made no explicit reference to McCulloch v. Maryland,"' but
the implicit reference to that case did not escape Petigru. Petigru thundered in
response, "What shall be said of the monstrous fallacy of making this
[McCulloch's expansive interpretation of the Necessary and Proper clause] a
precedent for establishing a Court of Star Chamber as incident to captures on
land."
59
Judge Magrath upheld the validity of the substantive provisions of the
sequestration acts finding them within the power of the Confederate
Congress"6 and not repugnant to the law of nations"" or to natural law. 62
Responding to the argument of attorney J.W. Wilkinson, who did not contest
this constriction. Compare U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power... to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States
...."), with C.S.A. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have power... to pay the debts,
provide for the common defence, and carry on the government of the Confederate States; but no
bounties shall be granted from the treasury; nor shall any duties or taxes on importations from
foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry ... ."). See generally
CHARLES ROBERTLEE, JR., THE CONFE ERATE CONSTITUTIONS 178-79 (Greenwood Press 1974)
(1963) (providing a side by side comparison of the two constitutions and the spending clauses).
155. Tim SEQUESTRATION CASES, supra note 155, at 22 ("The Writ of Garnishment, as it
is called, is illegal and unwarranted.").
156. Id. at 23.
157. Id. at 18.
[This power is] plainly and necessarily included in the war-maklng power,
which power is expressly given to Congress and expressly forbidden to the
States. From the very nature of the case all powers incidental to the carrying
on of the war must be exercised by the common agent of all the States
engaged in the war, to insure uniformity.
Id.
158. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The Confederate States' attorney could have hardly
stomached an explicit reference to the expansive interpretation of the necessary and proper clause
in McCulloch.
159. Tim SEQuESTRATION CASES, supra note 155, at 23.
160. Idi at 53-57. "[1 have] not the slightest doubt that the power is in the Congress of the
Confederate States to confiscate in time of war, the property of public enemies, within the
territories of the Confederate States; I cannot sustain in the proposition which challenges its
constitutionality or impeaches its validity." Id. at 57.
161. Id. at 47-53.
162. Id. at 57-59.
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the Acts' basic validity, Magrath ruled as a matter of statutory construction
that the Act was not intended to intrude upon the attorney-client privilege. An
attorney asserting this privilege would not have to respond to questions
pursuant to a writ of garnishment.163 Shortly after this case the Confederate
Congress amended the statutes to abolish the writs of garnishment."6
V. CONCLUSION
Petigru was a remarkably able lawyer and a complex, principled individual.
Constrained by time and place, he pursued justice for rich and poor
alike-often invoking lofty principles of natural law while being cared for by
slaves.
The Bar of Charleston's memorial with its glowing resolutions and
numerous individual orations, speaks eloquently to Petigru's fine qualities as
a lawyer and as a man, as do the proceedings of the Historical Societies of
Massachusetts and New York.'65 Some twenty years after his death, Alexander
Lawton extolled Petigru's virtues in a thirty-three page address delivered at the
1882 American Bar Association annual meeting.",
The preface to the Charleston Bar's eulogy suggests that Petigru never
suffered because of his principled and sometimes unpopular positions. 67 Being
hired at a handsome salary to codify the state's laws on the eve of the Civil War
supports this assertion. Nonetheless, the claim is misleading because his
principles sometimes imposed hardships on him. One of Petigru's strongest
commitments, and one that every lawyer should emulate, was to honor his
word, no matter the cost. For him the cost was occasionally high, such as when
he doggedly insisted on making good the debts of his friends.
Now that I know more about the man behind the Petigru name, I
understand how fine a name "Petigru College" was for the law school. He was
not superman, and his life did contain glaring contradictions. He was, however,
widely recognized as an outstanding attorney. He was a man of principle,
courageously representing politically unpopular issues and clients. He had
close ties to the University of South Carolina and devoted considerable energy
to the teaching of law.
"Petigru College," the bronze letters with which this essay began, first
163. Id. at 62 ("I consider... the privilege... a good defence to the requirement of the
Writ; and that it protects the defendant, either as a party or a witness, in not making further answer
to the matters, which have been communicated to him in his professional capacity.").
164. See Act of Feb. 15, 1862, ch. 71, Confederate States of America Stat. 260, 261.
165. See supra text accompanying note 9.
166. ALEXANDERR. LAWTON, ANNUALADDRESSBEFORETHEAMERICAN BARASSOCIATION
ATSARATOGA SPRINGS,N.Y., AUG. 9,1882, at 177 (Philadelphia, George S. Harris & Sons 1883)
(available in the South Caroliniana Library).
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appeared on what is now Currell College, near the top of the Horseshoe, when
that newly constructed building was dedicated as the law school in 1919.168 In
1950, the letters were transferred to the new law building at the corner of Green
and Pickens Streets'69 which remained the law school's home until 1972. Why
those letters remain on a building that now houses the bursar's office, is less
comprehensible. The current law school possesses only a replica of the letters
in a cabinet in the law school's lobby.
Why is the present law school building not dedicated to Petigru? The
Petigru Society attempted to dedicate the building in his honor; 0 but the
pragmatic administration declined, hoping instead to add to the school's then
minuscule endowment by finding a well-heeled alumnus willing to part with a
million dollars for fifty years or so of fame. Unfortunately, however, a quarter
of a century later our law school is still the "Your Name Here" Law Center and
our endowment is still inadequate.
In the midst of the University's capital campaign, is it too much to hope
that there are alumni out there who, perhaps too modest to envision their own
names on the law school, would donate money on the explicit condition that it
be named what it should have been named in the first place? Of course, were
we operating in the spirit of Petigru, we would simply change the name
ourselves without regard to potential financial consequences.
168. 2 DANIEL VALKER HOLLIS, UNIvERSrrY OF SOUTH CAROLINA: COLLEGE TO
UNIVERsITY 342 (1956).
169. Id.
170. PEASE&PEASE, supra note 4, at 10-11 (chronicling the efforts of the Petigru Society,
an informal association of law students, to dedicate the law school building to Petigru).
The short-lived Petigru Society was subsequently reincarnated as the Petigru Public Interest
Law Society, a law student organization that encourages the practice of law in the public interest.
The Society raises funds in various ways, including the sale ofT-shirts emblazoned with Petigru's
perhaps apocryphal statement, "South Carolina-4oo small for a republic, too large for an
asylum." See supra note 91.
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